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Abstract:  
 
In this study, we test whether bankers make more loans when they enjoy superior creditor 
protection. We test these hypotheses using bank-level data from 35 developed countries and 113 
developing countries over the period 2000-2006 and using a random-effects model that controls 
for bank heterogeneity. We find that bankers allocate a significantly larger portion of their assets 
to risky loans: (i) when they enjoy English common-law legal origin rather than French civil-law 
legal origin; (ii) when creditors’ rights are weaker; (iii) when their banks are larger; and (iv) 
when the largest shareholder has a lower percentage ownership. We also find that bankers in 
developing countries, but not in developed countries, allocate a significantly larger portion of 
their assets to risky loans when legal enforcement of creditor rights is more efficient. Overall, 
these results provide strong support for the theory of legal origin but provide only mixed support 
for the “power” theories of credit.  
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1. Introduction 
  During the past decade, financial researchers have established that legal origin and investor 
protection are important determinants of financial development. The “law-and-finance” 
literature, which grew out of the seminal works of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, hereafter “LLSV”  (1997, 1998), has demonstrated that differences in the legal 
protection of investors explain much of the cross-country variation in financial-sector 
development and that legal origin explains much of the cross-country variation in legal 
protection of investors.
1 The “finance and growth” literature, which is most closely associated 
with King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1995, 1998), 
has established that financial sector development is positively related to economic growth. 
Together, these two literatures tie legal protection to economic development through financial 
sector development. 
  Most studies in these two areas have analyzed country-level data, usually focusing on how 
investor protection affects the amount of private-sector credit, which King and Levine (1993) 
and many other studies have linked to future economic growth. One question left unanswered by 
this literature is how individual lenders respond to differences in governance regimes. More 
specifically, do bankers take on more risk by making more loans when they enjoy stronger 
creditor protection? This question is especially important to emerging market economies, where 
bond markets are often non-existent and bank debt is the primary source of business and 
consumer credit.   
                                                            
1 See LLSV (1997, 1998 and 2002); Levine (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003); Qian and Strahan (2006); Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2007); John, Litov and Yeung (2008); Acharya, Amihud and Litov 
(2010); and Houston et al. (2010).   - 2 - 
  Our study is an empirical test of the “power” theory of credit, which posits that lenders will 
grant more credit when they can more easily force repayment by borrowers. This theory is 
generally attributed to Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), and Hart and Moore (1994, 
1998). We test whether bankers make more loans when they are better protected by strong 
creditor rights and by efficient judicial enforcement. Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, hereafter 
DMS, (2007) analyze this issue at the country level, looking at the volume of private sector 
credit. 
  In this article, we extend “the law-and-finance” literature by using firm-level data from 
banks in 113 developing and 35 developed countries to analyze how individual lenders respond 
to country-level differences in legal origin and creditor protection. Following LLSV (1998) and 
DMS (2007), we distinguish between creditors’ rights and efficiency of enforcement. Our 
analysis rests on a panel data set of 2,677 commercial banks from 148 countries over the period 
2000-2006.
2 We are especially interested in our results for developing countries for at least three 
reasons: first, there is wide variation in legal origin across these countries; second, banks are the 
primary source of credit in most of these countries; and third, banking in these parts of the world 
has received scant attention in the academic literature.  
  Using a random-effects model that controls for bank heterogeneity, we find that lenders 
allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets to loans: (i) when they enjoy English 
common-law legal origin rather than French civil-law legal origin; (ii) when creditors’ rights are 
weaker; (iii) when their banks are larger; and (iv) when the largest shareholder has a lower 
percentage ownership. We also find that bankers in developing countries, but not in developed 
countries, allocate a significantly larger portion of their assets to risky loans when legal 
                                                            
2 We stop our analysis period at the year 2006 in order to avoid contamination from the effects of the financial crisis, 
which began in 2007.   - 3 - 
enforcement of creditor rights is more efficient. Overall, these results provide strong support for 
the theory of legal origin but provide mixed support for the “power” theory of credit. Our finding 
that banks make fewer loans when creditors’ rights are stronger is supportive of a “dark side” to 
creditors’ rights, as proposed by Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010), but contradicts the results 
reported by Houston et al. (2010), who find that stronger creditor rights are associated with 
greater bank risk-taking. Our opposing findings regarding the effects of creditors’ rights and the 
effects of judicial enforcement also highlight the importance of distinguishing between strong 
legal rights and efficient judicial enforcement of those rights, as pointed out by LLSV (1998). 
  Our primary contribution to the literature is new evidence from bank-level data of a bank-
lending channel by which better legal protection, especially in developing countries, leads to 
more credit and, consequently, to better financial-sector development. With better judicial 
enforcement, bankers increase the portion of their asset portfolios allocated to loans. In 
aggregate, this should lead to higher levels of private sector credit, which the “finance and 
growth” literature has shown to be positively related to economic growth.  
  We also contribute to the growing literature on the relation between investor protection and 
corporate risk-taking (John, Litov and Yeung (2008); Laeven and Levine (2008); Acharya, 
Amihud and Litov (2010); and Houston et al. (2010)). Here, we provide new firm-level evidence 
that banking firms take on more risk when their interests are better protected by the judiciary. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the most 
relevant literature. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses regarding creditor protection and 
bank lending. In Section 4, we discuss our data and methodology. Section 5 presents our results, 
followed, in Section 6, by a summary and conclusions. 
   - 4 - 
2. A brief review of the relevant literature 
  The “law and finance” literature essentially begins with LLSV (1997, 1998), who argue 
and provide empirical evidence at the country level that the most important determinant of 
capital markets development is the degree of legal protection provided to investors. Corporate 
finance flourishes in countries with legal systems that better protect investors’ rights and support 
contract enforcement. In addition, the authors find that a country’s “legal origin” is a 
fundamental determinant of investor protection. “Legal origin” refers to the legal family from 
which a country’s legal system evolved.  
  In their 1998 article, LLSV distinguish among two broad legal traditions: English common 
law and Roman civil law. Within the broad civil law tradition, they distinguish three families—
French, German and Scandinavian. LLSV find that countries with English common law tradition 
enjoy the best investor protection while countries with French civil law tradition suffer the worst 
investor protection.  They attribute these findings to differences in the legal protection from 
institutions left behind by the colonial powers. Also in this article, LLSV develop an index of 
creditor rights, which they show is higher in common law countries than in civil law countries. 
  In a 1999 follow-up article, LLSV expand the four families to five—with the addition of 
the Socialist civil law tradition, which enables them to better categorize eastern European 
countries that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union. They find that countries with 
Socialist civil law tradition suffer from poor legal protection similar to countries with French 
civil law tradition.  
  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) analyze a sample of 70 countries for evidence 
regarding how well legal origins can explain financial development.  Among other findings, but   - 5 - 
most relevant to this study, they find that credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector 
as a share of GDP is higher in countries of British legal origin. 
  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) construct two indices of 
procedural formalism in the legal resolution of disputes—how many days it takes to collect a 
bounced check and how many days it takes to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent. They find 
considerable variation in these measures and that procedural formalism is greater in civil-law 
countries than common law countries and in poor countries than in rich countries. 
  DMS (2007) extend previous work on legal protection of creditors to a panel analysis of 
129 countries over 25 years. They find that the creditors’ rights index developed by LLSV 
(1998) is associated with higher levels of private sector credit, but that this relationship does not 
hold in poorer countries. They also find that procedural formalism is associated with lower levels 
of private sector credit but, again, this relationship does not hold in poorer countries.  
  Qian and Strahan (2007) examine data on individual bank loans for evidence on how 
differences in legal systems affect the terms of bank loans. Like DMS (2007), they focus on the 
LLSV (1998) index of creditor rights rather than legal origin, and find that stronger creditor 
rights are associated with lower interest rates and longer maturities. However, they also report 
that loans in countries of English legal origin carry higher rates, and that higher rates are 
associated with greater financial development, which they attribute to higher loan demand for 
loans in more developed economies. 
  John, Litov and Yeung (2008) examine the relationship between investor protection and the 
choice of risk in corporate investment decisions. They argue that, when investors are better 
protected, the value of private benefits to insiders is lower, leading them to take on more risky 
positive net present value projects. Using data both from an international panel of 39 countries,   - 6 - 
they find that a positive relationship between investor protection and both firm-level riskiness 
and firm growth rates. However, the authors also make the case for a negative relationship 
between investor protection and risk-taking. In an environment where creditors’ rights are strong, 
there is less fear of expropriation by managers, thus reducing the likelihood of a dominant 
shareholder. The resulting reduction in ownership concentration may lead to greater managerial 
discretion in implementing conservative investment strategies to protect their own private 
benefits.  
  Laeven and Levine (2008) investigate how corporate governance influences bank risk-
taking at a sample of 288 large, publicly traded banks in 48 countries. They use the Z-score, 
defined as the sum of return on assets and equity to assets divided by the standard deviation of 
return on assets, as an inverse measure of risk, but also analyze the volatility of accounting 
earnings and stock market returns. Their primary finding is that the bank risk-taking increases 
with the ownership of the bank’s largest block holder. They also find that two pillars of banking 
supervision—capital requirements and official supervisory oversight of banks—do not appear to 
reduce bank risk-taking, calling into question much of the bank regulatory framework used by 
supervisors around the world.  
  Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010) propose a “dark side” to strong creditors’ rights, 
whereby these rights lead managers to reduce corporate risk-taking. Managers do so to avoid 
inefficient liquidation of assets and to preserve their private benefits of control. The authors 
provide empirical evidence supportive of their hypothesis in that firms in countries with strong 
creditors’ rights engage in diversifying mergers and choose operating policies that reduce the 
standard deviation of return on assets. Further, the authors find that these results are strongest in 
countries where there is no automatic stay on debtor’s assets in bankruptcy, and where   - 7 - 
management does not stay in bankruptcy (two of the four component rights that comprise the 
LLSV creditors’ rights index). 
  Houston et al. (2010) examine the relation between creditor rights as defined by the LLSV 
(1998) index and bank risk-taking as measured by the Z-score, which is also used by Laeven and 
Levine (2008). They find that banks in countries with stronger creditor rights take on more risk, 
and that countries with stronger creditors rights are more prone to financial crises, but also enjoy 
higher growth. 
The literature on “finance and economic growth” examines how economic growth is 
related to financial development. There now exists a wide empirical strand of the literature 
establishing a positive relationship between financial sector development and economic growth, 
although the direction of causality remains an issue of debate.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) document that stock-market liquidity and banking 
development are both positively and robustly correlated with future economic growth, capital 
accumulation and productivity growth.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the channels through which financial development 
promotes growth. They find that industrial sectors more dependent upon external finance 
develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Hence, 
banks promote economic growth by reducing the cost of external finance of firms.  
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that financial development boosts economic growth 
primarily by improving resource allocation and accelerating total factor productivity growth.  
  This positive effect of financial development on growth is found to be robust to different 
econometric methods, from the cross-country regressions, cross-country instrumental variable   - 8 - 
studies and time-series analyses to the dynamic panel GMM estimations. Levine (2004) provides 
an excellent review on the research in this area. 
  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 2002) and Levine (1999) tie these two strands of 
the literature together. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) use firm level data to investigate 
how differences in legal systems affect use of external financing. They find that a greater portion 
of firms in countries with more efficient legal systems use external financing to fund growth. 
  Levine (1999) uses country-level data to examine how legal environment affects financial 
development and subsequent long-run economic growth. He finds that financial intermediaries 
are better developed in countries with better legal protection and that the portion of financial 
intermediary development explained by the legal environment is positively related to economic 
growth. 
  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) use firm-level data from 40 countries to analyze 
how a country’s legal and financial systems affect a firm’s ability to access external finance to 
fund growth opportunities. They find that the access to external finance is primarily a function of 
the efficiency of a country’s legal system. 
 
3. Creditor Protection and Bank Lending: Hypotheses 
  In  this  section,  we  separate  creditor  protection  into  two  components—rights  and 
enforcement—and we set forth our hypotheses regarding how creditor protection influences bank 
lending. 
3.1 Creditor Protection Variables 
  Creditor protection encompasses both the legal rights of creditors and the ability of 
creditors to enforce those rights through the judiciary. Hence, we decompose creditor protection   - 9 - 
into two measurable components: creditors’ rights and judicial enforcement. We measure 
creditors’ rights (Creditors’ Rights) using the index developed by LLSV (1998), and we also 
consider its four components (CR1 through CR4), which we enumerate below. We measure 
judicial enforcement using the index of legal formalism developed by DMS (2007), where Legal 
Formalism is a country-level estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an unpaid debt 
equal to 50% of the country’s GDP per capita.  
3.2 Hypotheses Regarding Legal Origin, Creditor Protection and Bank Lending 
  Our primary hypotheses focus on how legal origin and creditor protection affect bank 
lending. Consistent with the “law-and-finance” literature and the “power” theory of credit, we 
hypothesize that the loan-to-asset ratio of a bank is a function of its country’s legal tradition and 
how well that country’s legal and judicial systems protect creditors. We expect credit from 
financial intermediaries as a share of assets to be higher in countries of English common law 
legal origin and lower in countries of French civil law legal origin. Also, better creditor 
protection in the form of stronger legal rights or more efficient judicial enforcement has the 
effect of reducing the expected loss rate on the bad-loan portfolio, which should lead to a higher 
loan-to-asset ratio.  
  We hypothesize that a bank adjusts its overall risk exposure to account for cross-country 
differences in creditor protection by changing the size of its total loan portfolio, which changes 
the size of the expected bad loan portfolio. In other words, when better creditor protection exists, 
the bank expects a lower loss rate on bad assets so it is willing to increase the amount it lends. 
Therefore, we expect that the loan-to-asset ratio is a positive function of the creditors’ rights 
index and the dummy variable indicating English legal origin (or, alternatively, a negative 
function of dummy variables for French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist legal origin, as   - 10 - 
English legal origin is our omitted category), but also a negative function of the legal formalism 
index. 
  Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010) offer an alternative hypothesis, which they refer to as 
the “dark side” of creditors’ rights. They focus on the incentives of the borrower rather than 
those of the lender. When creditors have stronger rights, the management and controlling 
shareholder of a debtor firm have incentives to reduce operating risk so that they reduce the 
probability that they will lose their private benefits of control. If this hypothesis is true, then 
stronger creditors’ rights should lead firms to borrow less, so that the lenders’ loan-to-asset ratios 
would be inversely related to creditors’ rights. 
3.3 Other Hypotheses 
  We posit six secondary hypotheses that may impact the risk-taking behavior of banks. First, 
we expect that banks with less diversified controlling shareholders will take on less risk so that 
the ownership of the largest shareholder should be inversely related to bank risk. In contrast, 
dominant shareholders controlling a pyramid of firms may be able to instruct lower-layer units to 
take on more risk in a tunneling process (John, Litov and Yeung (2008)).  
  Second, in countries where the size of the government is large relative to the economy, the 
presence of government-related officials is likely to be widespread in different economic 
activities. We expect that banks in countries with larger government sectors will have higher 
ratios of loans to assets as bureaucrats direct policy loans to State-owned enterprises. Our 
measure of government size is the ratio of private credit to total domestic credit and we expect 
this ratio to be negatively related to the loan-to-asset ratio. 
  Third, large banks that have access to large pools of deposits and money market funding 
are able to make more loans as compared to their smaller competitors. In addition, large banks   - 11 - 
are likely to be more diversified than small banks. For both reasons, we expect bank risk to 
increase with bank size so that the loan-to-asset ratio will be positively related to bank size, 
which we measure by the natural logarithm of bank assets. 
  Fourth, government-owned or controlled banks may play a key role in shaping the risk 
profile of domestic institutions. When the State is the controlling shareholder in a bank, credit is 
often directed toward select key industries without major regard to profitability (LLSV 2002). 
Consequently, we expect that State-controlled banks will have higher loan-to-asset ratios as the 
State has incentive to direct assets towards policy loans.  
  Fifth, foreign-controlled banks often operate to collect funds for the home office and to 
serve multinational customers who operate in a country. Consequently, we expect foreign-
controlled banks to have lower loan-to-asset ratios. 
  Finally, banks that operate in countries with higher income per capita face stronger loan 
demand from borrowers. Therefore, we expected a positive relation between our measure of 
economic development (the natural logarithm of GDP per capita) and the loan-to-asset ratio.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
         We retrieve bank-level financial data for the years 2000-2006 from the BankScope 
database provided by Fitch-IBCA (International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd). Our sample includes 
12,889 bank-year observations on 2,677 banks located in 148 countries, including 5,488 bank-
year observations on 1,147 banks in 35 developed countries and 7,411 bank-year observations on 
1,530 banks in 113 developing countries.    - 12 - 
  We collect information on total assets and total loans from the banks’ annual balance 
sheets. We use these financial data to create the ratio of total loans to total assets (Loans to 
Assets). We also create a measure of bank size as measured by ln (Assets)—the natural logarithm 
of total assets. 
  We also retrieve data on bank ownership from BankScope. We use this to construct 
ownership variables for the bank’s controlling shareholder, including Percentage Ownership; a 
dummy variable Largest Shareholder is Foreign, which is equal to one if the bank’s largest 
block holder owns at least ten percent of the bank’s shares and is identified as residing in a 
country other than the one in which the bank is located; and a dummy variable Largest 
Shareholder is the State, which is equal to one if the bank’s largest block holder is the 
government in which the  bank is located and owns at least ten percent of the bank’s shares.  
  We retrieve country-level “macro” data from the International Financial Statistics. These 
include GDP per capita, which we transform by taking its natural logarithm into (ln (GDP per 
Capita)), and the ratio of private sector credit to total domestic credit. We include the latter two 
variables to control for the effects of economic development and policy loans, respectively, on 
bank lending. 
  Finally, we collect information on legal origin, creditors’ rights, and legal formalism 
(efficiency of enforcement) from Professor Andrei Shleifer’s Harvard web pages.
3  Legal origin 
is coded as a set of five dummy variables, one each for English, French, Germanic, 
Scandinavian and Socialist legal systems. In our sample of developing countries, we have no 
Germanic or Scandinavian countries.  
                                                            
3 We are extremely grateful to Prof. Shleifer for sharing these data with us. At the time this 
manuscript was prepared, the dataset for the paper “Private Credit in 129 Countries” was 
available for download at: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset    - 13 - 
  Creditors’ Rights is an index first proposed by LLSV (1998) that consists of four 
components. Each component gets a value of one if the creditors’ right exists in a country and 
zero otherwise; the index is the sum of these four values. The four rights are: CR1, restrictions, 
such as creditors’ consent, when a debtor files for reorganization; CR2, the ability of a secured 
creditor to seize pledged collateral after a court approves a debtor’s petition for reorganization; 
CR3, the right of creditors to be paid first out of the proceeds from liquidation; and CR4, the 
right to replace management with an administrator during reorganization. Higher values imply 
stronger creditors’ rights. 
  Legal Formalism is an estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an unpaid debt 
equal to 50% of the country’s GDP per capita, which was first introduced and used by 
DMS (2007). As such, it can be viewed as an index of the inefficiency of legal enforcement 
because higher values are associated with less efficient judicial enforcement.
4 
  We then merge these country-level data with our bank-level data. A description of the 
country-level governance and macroeconomic variables appears in Table 1.  
4.2 Methodology 
  With these data, we estimate a series of multivariate regression models to test the 
hypotheses laid out in the previous section. Specifically, we analyze different versions of the 
following regression model: 
    Y i,t = α X j   +  β G j   +  δ O i  +  η Z j,t   +   ε i,t            (1) 
where:  
Y i,t is our key variable of interest for bank i during time t. It measures the quantity of credit 
by the ratio of total loans to total assets (where higher values indicate more operating risk); 
                                                            
4 For robustness, we also test other indicators of judicial enforcement from Djankov et al. (2003), 
e.g., the number of days to collect on a bounced check.   - 14 - 
  X j is a set of dummy variables describing the legal origin of country j; 
  G j is a set of structural variables describing the country j, including governance indices that 
  measure creditor protection; 
  O i denotes bank ownership variables, including the percentage of ownership of the 
  controlling shareholder and whether the bank is State or foreign controlled,  
  Z j, t controls for the macroeconomic environment in terms of  government size in the 
economy and the level of economic development; and 
  ε i, t is a random error term for bank i during year t. 
  Because  we  analyze  panel  data,  we  cannot  rely  upon  ordinary-least-squares  regression 
techniques, as our error terms would be serially correlated. Typically, one must choose between 
a  fixed-effects  model  and  a  random-effects  model  when  analyzing  panel  data  such  as  ours; 
however, we are constrained to using a random-effects model because our primary variables of 
interest—our indicators for legal origin and creditors’ rights—are invariant at both the bank and 
country levels. Therefore, we cannot estimate our models using the fixed-effects methodology 
since these governance variables would be collinear with the fixed-effects dummy variables. 
Consequently, we estimate all models using bank-level random effects. 
  We also cannot treat each bank as an independent observation because we are examining 
governance indicators measured only at the country level. Consequently, we calculate robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
  Our primary hypotheses are that: (1) banks in countries with English legal origin enjoy 
superior institutions that enable them to make more loans; (2) banks in countries with stronger   - 15 - 
creditors’ rights enjoy superior legal protection that enables them to make more loans; and (3) 
banks  in  countries  with  less  legal  formalism  or,  alternatively,  more  efficient  judicial 
enforcement, enjoy superior legal protection that enables them to make more loans. The logic 
behind our hypotheses is that bankers are concerned about the total risk exposure of their loan 
portfolio. When banks enjoy better creditor protection, the lower expected losses on bad loans 
enables them to increase operating risk by making more loans per dollar of assets. 
5.1 Univariate Descriptive Statistics 
  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and Table 3 shows the same for 
the sample of banks in developed and developing countries along with tests of differences in 
means. Overall, the average loan-to-asset ratio is 0.497 and is significantly higher in developed 
countries than in developing countries (0.515 vs. 0.483). The average bank size in the entire 
sample is $9.90 billion, and it is significantly larger in developed than in developing countries 
($17.90 billion vs. $3.26 billion). 
  Among the governance variables, the average number of enforcement collection days 
(Legal Formalism) is 339, and is significantly shorter in developed than in developing countries 
(244 vs. 418). The average value of the creditors’ rights index is 1.85 and is significantly higher 
in developed than in developing countries (1.90 vs. 1.81). In the developed sample, 49.9% of the 
banks are in countries of German legal origin, 29.2% in French legal origin, 14.3% in English 
legal origin, and 6.6% are in countries of Scandinavian legal origin. In the developing sample, 
46.6%, 24.7%, 22.9%, and 7.7% of banks are in countries of French, English, Socialist, and 
Germanic legal origins, respectively. 
  Among the ownership variables, the average percentage ownership of the controlling 
shareholder is 62.21% and is significantly lower in developed than developing countries (65.9%   - 16 - 
vs. 55.7%). The State is the controlling shareholder for 5.0% of the banks, and this percentage is 
significantly lower in developed than in developing countries (1.5% vs. 7.9%). The largest 
shareholder is foreign for 30.2% of the banks, and this percentage is significantly lower in 
developed than in developing countries (26.6% vs. 33.2%). 
  Among the macroeconomic control variables, average GDP per capita is $15,449 and is 
significantly higher in developed than in developing countries ($30,680 vs. $2,822). The average 
ratio of private credit to total domestic credit is 0.892 and is significantly lower in developed 
than in developing countries (0.821 vs. 0.951). 
5.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis: Loans to Assets 
  The results of the multivariate analyses of equation (1) explaining the loan-to-asset ratio 
appear in Tables 4 – 6 for the full sample, developed countries, and developing countries, 
respectively. In each of these three tables, we present five specifications that we estimate using a 
bank random-effects model with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. We begin, 
in specification (1), with four dummy variables indicating legal origin (French, Socialist, 
German and Scandinavian, with English being the omitted category), our measure of Legal 
Formalism and our control variable (ln (GDP per capita)) for differences in economic 
development; in specification (2), we add our index of Creditors’ Rights; in specification (3), we 
replace the index of Creditors’ Rights with its four components (CR1 – CR4); in specification 
(4), we add our four bank-specific variables for bank size (ln (Total Assets)) and ownership 
structure (Percentage Ownership of Largest Shareholder, Largest Shareholder is the State, and 
Largest Shareholder is Foreign): and finally, in (5), we add our control variable for the size of 
the government in the credit market (Private Credit).   - 17 - 
 
5.2.1 Full Sample of Developed and Developing Countries 
  In Table 4 are the results where the dependent variable is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets and we consider our full sample of banks in both developed and developing countries. We 
assess the effect of legal origin relative to the omitted category, which is English legal origin. 
Hence, the coefficients on French, Socialist, German and Scandinavian measure the difference 
in the loan-to-asset ratio of these groups from that of the excluded English group of banks.  
  In specification (1), none of the four legal-origin variables are statistically significant at the 
0.05 level and only French is significant at the 0.10 level.  The coefficient on French indicates 
that the loan to asset ratio is 4.94 percentage points lower at banks in countries of French legal 
origin than at banks in countries of English legal origin. Given the full sample’s average loan-to-
asset ratio of slightly less than 0.50, this represents a ten-percent decrease in the amount of credit 
that banks are injecting into economies of French legal origin. The coefficients for German and 
Scandinavian are negative but significant. Only the coefficient for Socialist is positive; it is 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.103).  In general, these results support one of our primary 
hypotheses—that, in countries of English legal origin, better legal protection enables banks to 
take on more portfolio risk as compared to banks in countries of other legal origins and, 
particularly, in countries of French legal origin. The DMS (2007) measure of Legal Formalism—
the natural logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of a country’s 
GDP per capita—is not statistically significant and the coefficient is smaller than its standard 
error. Our control variable for differences in the level of economic development—the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita—is positive and highly significant (t-statistic = 5.22), indicating 
that banks in countries with higher GDP per capita have higher loan-to-asset ratios. This finding   - 18 - 
supports our prediction that banks in better developed economies allocate a larger portion of their 
assets to risky loans because of higher loan demand than in lesser developed economies.  
Moreover, this control variable remains positive and highly significant in all five specifications, 
underlining the importance of its inclusion in this analysis. 
  In specification (2), we add our index of Creditors’ Rights. The coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 0.10 level, indicating that, in countries with stronger creditor rights, 
banks have lower, rather than higher, ratios of loans to assets. This is consistent with the dark 
side of creditors’ rights as laid out by Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010). However, it is 
contrary to the findings of Houston et al. (2010), who find that stronger creditors’ rights are 
associated with increased risk-taking. To the extent that the loan-to-asset ratio measures bank 
risk taking, our results suggest that stronger creditors’ rights reduce, rather than increase, risk-
taking. In the presence of the creditors’ rights index, our indicator for banks in countries of 
French legal origin increases in absolute magnitude and becomes statistically significant at better 
than the 0.05 level. 
  In specification (3), we seek a better understanding of the relation between creditors’ rights 
and bank lending by decomposing the index into its four component indicator variables. Here, 
we find that CR2, which indicates that “creditors can seize collateral after a debtor’s filing for 
reorganization is approved by the courts,” is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, whereas 
the remaining three components lack statistical significance at even the 0.10 level. This finding 
suggests that borrowers seek less credit when creditors enjoy this particular legal right. Again,  
our findings fit well with those of Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010), who find that companies 
reduce operating risk in countries granting this right to creditors. However, our findings conflict 
with Houston et al. (2010), who report that banks take on more, rather than less, risk when they   - 19 - 
receive this creditor right. Finally, in this specification, our indicator for banks in countries of 
French legal origin remains negative but is significant at only the 0.10 level (p-value = 0.75). 
  In specification (4), we add our four bank-specific variables measuring size and ownership 
structure. We find that bank size as measured by the log of total assets is positive and highly 
significant (t-statistic = 5.19). The percentage ownership of the largest shareholder is negative 
and significant at better than the 0.05 level. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that 
less diversified owners will choose a less risky loan-to-asset ratio. However, it is inconsistent 
with Laeven and Levine (2008), who report that bank risk increases with the ownership of the 
largest shareholder. The indicator variables for banks with the State as a controlling blockholder 
and with a foreign entity as the controlling blockholder each are negative, consistent with our 
hypotheses, but lack statistical significance. With the addition of these variables, our results 
regarding legal origin change notably, with the indicator for banks in countries of Socialist legal 
origin almost tripling in size and becoming statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level. 
The indicator for banks in countries of French legal origin remains negative and significant at the 
0.10 level (p-value = 0.058). 
  Finally, in specification (5), we add the ratio of private-sector credit to total domestic 
credit—our control variable for policy lending. This variable is negative but insignificant, and its 
addition does not qualitatively change the results shown in specification (4). 
5.2.2 Developed Countries Only 
  In Table 5 are the results where the dependent variable is the ratio of total loans to total 
assets and we only include in the analysis our sub-sample of banks in developed countries. We 
present the results for the same five specifications that we tested in Table 4 for the full sample.   - 20 - 
  In specification (1), none of our explanatory variables are statistically significant at even 
the 0.10 level. The coefficients on French and German legal origins are negative but smaller than 
their associated standard errors. The coefficient on legal formalism is very close to zero. These 
results suggest that creditor protection plays little role in the decisions of banks in developed 
countries to choose their loan-to-asset ratios. Also of note is the fact that our control variable for 
differences in levels of economic development is not significantly different from zero, and 
remains so in all five specifications. We speculate that this points to the lack of variability in 
economic development across developed countries when compared to the variability in GDP per 
capita across developing countries. 
  In specification (2), we add the index of creditors’ rights. It, too, is statistically insignificant 
and the coefficient is smaller than its standard error.  
  In specification (3), we replace the creditors’ rights index with its four component indicator 
variables. We now find that CR3 (the right of creditors to be paid first out of the proceeds of a 
liquidating firm) is negative and significant at the 0.05 level whereas CR4 (the right of creditors 
to have an administrator, rather than firm management, take responsibility for managing the firm 
during reorganization) is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. In addition, we now find that 
the coefficient of the indicator for French legal origin becomes much larger in magnitude and 
statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. 
  In specification (4), we add our four bank-level variables for size and ownership structure. 
As in Table 5, we find that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively related to bank size and that the 
coefficient is highly significant (t-statistic = 3.88). We also find that the indicator for a foreign 
controlling blockholder is negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level and the coefficient 
indicates that the loan-to-asset ratio is lower by 4.45 percentage points when the controlling   - 21 - 
block holder is foreign. Foreign banks do not generally serve a large retail base as compared to 
domestic banks, and their parent firms usually impose limits on their credit risk exposure to the 
local market. The coefficient on the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder is negative 
but not significant. The coefficient on the indicator for banks with the State as the controlling 
blockholder is essentially zero. 
  In specification (5), we add our control for government size and find that it is positive and 
significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that the loan-to-asset ratio is significantly higher when the 
ratio of private sector credit to total domestic credit is higher.  This finding argues against our 
hypothesis that banks in countries where the government plays a more prominent role in the 
credit market will have higher loan-to-asset ratios as they allocate credit to politically connected 
firms. 
5.2.3 Developing Countries Only 
  In Table 6 are the results where the dependent variable is the loan-to-asset ratio and where 
we only include our sub-sample of banks in developing countries. Again, we present the results 
for the same five specifications tested in Table 4 for our full sample. 
  In specification (1), each of the three indicators of legal origin is negative, but only French 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient on French indicates that the loan to 
asset ratio is 6.8 percentage points lower at banks in countries of French legal origin than at 
banks in countries of English legal origin. Given the average loan-to-asset ratio of slightly less 
than 0.50, this represents a thirteen percent decrease in the amount of credit that banks are 
injecting into economies of French legal origin compared to economies with a common law 
tradition. Also in specification (1), we find that the coefficient on our measure of Legal 
Formalism is negative and significant at better than the 0.05 level. This indicates that the loan-to-  - 22 - 
asset ratio is lower when it takes longer for creditors to recover bad debts. These results 
regarding legal origin and legal formalism are robust to the inclusion of our additional control 
variables in specifications (2) – (5).  In fact, the statistical significance of the legal formalism 
indicator increases in our most inclusive specification (t-statistic = 3.20, p-value = 0.0014). In 
conjunction with our findings in Table 5, these results suggest that the importance of legal origin 
and legal formalism for bank lending is more pronounced in developing than in developed 
countries. Our control for differences in the levels of economic development is positive and 
highly significant (t-statistic = 6.76) and remains so as we add explanatory variables in each of 
the remaining specifications. 
  In specification (2), we add our index of creditor rights. The coefficient of creditors’ rights 
is negative and statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level. Again, this is consistent with 
the findings of Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010) but contrary to the findings of Houston et al. 
(2010).   
  In specification (3), we replace the index of creditor’s rights with its four components. We 
find that CR2 (the right to seize collateral) is negative and significant at better than 0.01 
(t-statistic = 3.05, p-value = 0.0023), consistent with our results for the full sample and with 
Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010). This result is robust to inclusion of the additional 
explanatory variables in specifications (4) and (5). CR1 also is negative and is significant at the 
0.10 level; CR4 is negative and CR3 is positive but each lacks statistical significance. 
  In specification (4), we add our four bank-specific variables measuring size and ownership 
structure. As is the case for the full sample and for the developed-country sub-sample, bank size 
is positive and significant at better than the 0.01 level, indicating that larger banks have higher 
loan-to-asset ratios.  We also find that the percentage ownership of the largest shareholder is   - 23 - 
negative and significant at better than the 0.01 level, supportive of our hypothesis that large 
undiversified shareholders prefer lower-risk portfolios. The indicator for the State as the 
controlling blockholder is negative but only marginally significant (t-statistic = 1.57, 
p-value = 0.117); the indicator for a foreign controlling blockholder is positive but only a 
fraction of its standard error in magnitude. 
  In specification (5), we add our control for the size of government in the credit sector. The 
ratio of private sector credit to total domestic credit is negative and insignificant, but, in its 
presence, the coefficient of indicator for State as the controlling blockholder increases in 
magnitude and in statistical significance (p-value = 0.020); while CR1 loses its statistical 
significance. 
5.3 Robustness Tests 
  Not shown in the tables are results from a number of additional regressions that we run to 
test the robustness of our findings. We iteratively include a number of additional country-level 
governance and regulatory variables that have been examined by other researchers. Many of 
these variables are highly correlated so we cannot incorporate all of them in a single model. 
Instead, we add them one at a time to the specifications shown in our tables. Governance 
variables include the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom and several of its components 
(Financial Freedom, Government Size, Property Rights and Freedom from Corruption).
5 None 
of these are significant when added to our models and their inclusion does not qualitatively affect 
our results. We obtained additional governance variables from the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators project, including the Rule of Law, Political Stability and Absence of 
                                                            
5 Beach and Kane (2008) document how the 10 indices of economic freedom are calculated. At 
the time of this study, information on the index and its components was available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/index. 
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Violence, Voice and Accountability and Control of Corruption. 
6 When we include these indices 
in our models, we find that the Rule of Law is highly correlated with our measure of legal 
formalism and its inclusion diminishes the significance of legal formalism by inflating its 
standard error. Inclusion of the other indices does not qualitatively affect our findings. 
  We include two indicators for the existence of a public or private credit registry developed 
by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2008).
7 Neither of these is significant when added to our 
models and their inclusion does not qualitatively affect our findings. This finding contradicts 
Houston et al. (2010, p. 36) who report that “the benefits of information sharing appear to be 
universally positive.” However, their measure of risk-taking is the Z-score, whereas ours is the ratio 
of loans to assets. 
  We consider three regulatory variables analyzed by Laeven and Levine (2008)—an 
indicator for whether or not a country provides deposit insurance,
8 an index of regulatory 
restrictions on capital, and an index of official supervisory powers (both developed by Barth et 
al. (2004)). 
9 Again, none of these variables are statistically significant in our models and our 
main findings are maintained.  
  Following DMS (2007), we include total GDP to control for the possibility that credit 
markets only function when they are large enough to cover institutional fixed costs, and inflation 
                                                            
6 At the time of this study, these indices were available from the World Bank’s website: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
7 Both of these indicator variables are included in the dataset for the paper “Private Credit in 129 
Countries,” which, at the time of this study, was available for download at: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset.  
8 At the time of this study, this index was available from the World Bank’s website:   
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2
0699211~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html.  
9  At the time of this study, these variables were available from the World Bank’s website :   
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:2
0345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html    - 25 - 
to account for the possibility that high inflation might undermine bank lending.
10 Neither is 
significant and their inclusion does not qualitatively alter our results. 
5.4 Discussion 
  From the results in Tables 4 – 6, we find similarities and differences in lending for banks 
located in developed and in developing countries. With respect to legal origin, banks of French 
legal origin have significantly lower loan-to-asset ratios than banks of English legal origin. This 
result holds for the full sample, for the developed-country sub-sample and for the developing-
country sub-sample, but is more precisely measured at banks in developing countries. The 
magnitude is large—6.8 percentage points for developing countries and 11.9 percentage points 
for developed countries. Given the average loan-to-asset ratio of around 0.50, this translates into 
a 14 to 24 percent difference in the amount of credit at French legal-origin banks relative to 
English legal-origin banks. 
  With respect to the legal rights of creditors, we find that stronger creditor rights are 
associated with lower loan-to-asset ratios. When we measure creditors’ rights using the LLSV 
index, this result is statistically significant for the full sample and for the developing-country 
sub-sample, but not for the developed-country sub-sample. When we decompose the LLSV 
index into its four components, we find that the results for the index are driven primarily by only 
one component and that this component is different in developed and in developing countries. In 
developed countries, it is the right to be paid first out of the proceeds of a liquidating firm that is 
driving down the loan-to-asset ratio whereas in developing countries, it is the right to seize 
collateral in reorganization that is reducing the loan-to-asset ratio. To the extent that the loan-to-
asset ratio is a measure of bank risk-taking, our results are consistent with Acharya et al. (2009), 
                                                            
10 Both of these variables are included in the dataset for the paper “Private Credit in 129 
Countries.”    - 26 - 
who posit that borrowers reduce risk when creditors are better protected, but are in striking 
contrast to those of Houston et al. (2010), who find that better creditor rights are associated with 
increased risk-taking. We think that this discrepancy is attributable to their measure of risk, 
which is largely a function of the standard deviation of returns calculated over 2000-2007. When 
measured over such a short period of time, we think that the standard deviation may be inversely 
related to ex-ante risk, reflecting variability in returns associated with financial crises that 
occurred during the measurement period rather than reflecting ex-ante risk. To the extent that 
crises only occur once every decade, banks in countries that have already suffered a crisis may 
actually be ex-ante less risky than banks in countries that did not experience a crisis during 2000-
2007, but did in 2008-2009. It would be interesting to see which set of results are robust over the 
last half of this decade. 
  With respect to the efficiency of enforcement as proxied by Djankov’s legal-formalism 
measure of the number of days needed to collect a debt equal to 50% of GDP per capita, we find 
no evidence that efficiency of enforcement is important in developed countries, but strong 
evidence that it is important in developing countries, where other governance institutions are 
much weaker than in developed countries. This finding suggests that efficiency of enforcement is 
an important substitute for those underdeveloped institutions in protecting creditors. With more 
efficient judicial enforcement, bankers in developing countries allocate a significantly larger 
portion of the asset portfolio to risky loans. 
  Beyond the importance of legal origin, the only other consistent result across developed 
and developing countries is that the loan-to-asset ratio is a positive function of bank size. Larger 
banks, which are more diversified than smaller banks, allocate a significantly higher portion of 
the asset portfolio to risky loans.   - 27 - 
  With respect to our two control variables, we find that it is most important to control for 
differences in levels of economic development in developing countries and when both developed 
and developing countries are analyzed together. This is not surprising, but we had expected our 
control variable—the log of GDP per capita—to be important even in the developed sub-sample. 
We also find that it is important to control for the role of the government in the credit market, 
which we proxy with the ratio of private-sector credit to total domestic credit. In developed 
countries, the smaller is the role of government, the more banks allocate their asset portfolio to 
risky loans. In developing countries, this variable is not significant, but its inclusion illuminates 
the role of the State as the controlling blockholder in reducing the loan-to-asset ratio of State-
controlled banks. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
  In this article, we extend the law-and-finance literature by using bank-level data from 35 
developed and 113 developing countries to analyze how bank lending behavior responds to 
differences in legal origin and creditor protection. Using a random-effects model that controls for 
bank heterogeneity, we find that bankers allocate a significantly higher portion of their assets to 
loans: (i) when they enjoy English common law legal origin rather than French civil law legal 
origin; (ii) when creditors’ rights are weaker; (iii) when their banks are larger; and (iv) when the 
largest shareholder has a lower percentage ownership. We also find that bankers in developing 
countries, but not in developed countries, allocate a significantly larger portion of their assets to 
risky loans when legal enforcement of creditor rights is more efficient. These results strongly 
support the theory of legal origin but provide only mixed support for the “power” theories of 
credit.    - 28 - 
  Our finding that banks make fewer loans when creditors’ rights are stronger is supportive 
of a “dark side” to creditors’ rights, as proposed by Acharya, Amihud and Litov (2010), but it 
contradicts the results reported by Houston et al. (2010), who find that stronger creditor rights 
are associated with greater bank risk-taking. Our opposing findings regarding the effects of 
creditors’ rights and the effects of judicial enforcement also highlight the importance of 
distinguishing between strong legal rights and efficient judicial enforcement of those rights, as 
pointed out by LLSV (1998). We do not address how the financial crisis that began in 2007 
affected bank lending; we leave that most interesting topic to future research. 
  In summary, our results provide new evidence on the importance of legal origin and 
creditor protection to the provision of bank credit, which has implications for financial sector 
development and economic growth. Researchers in the “finance and growth” literature have 
established that better financial sector development as measured by aggregate domestic private 
credit leads to higher levels of economic growth. We extend the literature by documenting one 
channel through which creditor protection leads to financial sector development. With better 
creditor protection, bankers increase the portion of their assets allocated to loans. In aggregate, 
this should lead to higher levels of private-sector credit, which the “finance and growth” 
literature has shown to be positively related to economic growth.   - 29 - 
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Table 1:  
Definitions of Country and Firm Level Governance and Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Variable Name  Description 
Legal Origin   Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country 
(English, French, Socialist, German, Scandinavian).  
Source: Djankov et al. (2003, 2007). 
Legal Formalism  An estimate of the number of days necessary to collect an unpaid debt equal to 50% 
of the country’s GDP per capita. Higher values indicate greater procedural formalism 
and greater inefficiency in judicial enforcement. 
Source: Djankov et al. (2007) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Component 1 
Restrictions, such as creditors’ consent, when a debtor files for reorganization. 
This component gets a weight of one if a country’s legal system grants that creditors’ 
right and zero otherwise. 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Component 2 
Right of creditors to seize collateral after a debtor’s filing for reorganization is 
approved by the court. 
This component gets a weight of one if a country’s legal system grants that creditors’ 
right and zero otherwise. 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Component 3 
Right of creditors to be paid first out of the proceeds of a liquidating firm. 
This component gets a weight of one if a country’s legal system grants that creditors’ 
right and zero otherwise. 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Component 4 
An administrator, rather than management, takes responsibility for running a firm 
during reorganization. 
This component gets a weight of one if a country’s legal system grants that creditors’ 
right and zero otherwise. 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Index 
Index of components 1 through 4, where each component gets a weight of one if a 
country’s legal system grants that creditors’ right and zero otherwise. Ranges from 
zero to four, with higher values indicating stronger creditors’ rights. 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
Largest Shareholder  Percentage of ownership of the largest shareholder. Source: Authors’ calculation 
from BankScope. 
State Shareholder  Largest shareholder is a state or public authority. Source: Authors’ calculation from 
BankScope. 
Foreign Shareholder  Largest shareholder is foreign. Source: Authors’ calculation from BankScope. 
Private Credit/ 
Domestic Credit 
The ratio of the claims on private credit to domestic credit.  This is the fraction of 
domestic credit which finances the private sector. Source: International Financial 
Statistics. 
Per Capita GDP   Logarithm of per capita GDP. Source: International Financial Statistics 
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Table 2:  
Descriptive Statistics- All Countries 
 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,677 banks in 148 countries over the years 2000-2006, or a total of 12,084 
observations. Loans to Assets is the ratio of total loans to total assets; Total Assets are measured in USD thousands. 
Each of these two variables is measured at the bank level in each year. English, French, Socialist, German and 
Scandinavian are dummy variables indicating English, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian legal origin as 
first defined by LLSV 1998. Legal Formalism is the number of days needed to enforce a contract; higher values 
indicate less efficient judicial enforcement. Creditors’ Rights is an index defined by LLSV (1998) where higher 
values indicate stronger rights; its components are labeled CR1 through CR4. Largest Shareholder is the ownership 
share of the largest shareholder. Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority and Largest Shareholder is Foreign 
are two dummy variables set to 1 if the largest shareholder is a public authority or foreign, respectively. Private 
Credit is the ratio of claims on private credit to domestic credit, and GDPPC is the per capita Gross Domestic 
Product expressed in USD. Table 1 provides more details on each variable.  
 
Variable    Median  Mean 
Std Error 
of the 
Mean 
Loans to Assets    0.5162  0.4858  0.0020 
Total Assets     601,529  9,068,604  467,478 
English  Legal Origin     0  0.203  0.0035 
French Legal Origin     0  0.335  0.0042 
Socialist Legal Origin     0  0.137  0.0030 
German Legal Origin     0  0.297  0.0040 
Scandinavian Legal Origin     0  0.029  0.0015 
Legal Formalism    330.00  344.37  2.2881 
CR- Creditors Rights     2  1.8656  0.0092 
CR1- Restrictions on filing for reorganization    0  0.3129  0.0041 
CR2- Right to seize collateral    0  0.3448  0.0042 
CR3- Right to be paid first    1  0.6550  0.0042 
CR4- Right to run a firm during reorganization    1  0.5529  0.0044 
Largest Shareholder    0.7  0.6221  0.0032 
Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority    0  0.0501  0.0019 
Largest Shareholder is Foreign    0  0.3528  0.0041 
Private Credit    0.8364  0.9034  0.0164 
GDPPC    6,879  15,977  145 
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Table 3: 
Descriptive Statistics- Developed Vs. Developing Countries 
 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,147 banks in 35 developed countries and 1,530 banks in 113 developing countries over the years 2000-2006. Loans to 
Assets is the ratio of total loans to total assets; Total Assets are measured in USD thousands. Each of these two variables is measured at the bank level in each 
year. English, French, Socialist, German and Scandinavian are dummy variables indicating English, French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian legal origin as 
first defined by LLSV 1998. Legal Formalism is the number of days needed to enforce a contract; higher values indicate less efficient judicial enforcement. 
Creditors’ Rights is an index defined by LLSV (1998) where higher values indicate stronger rights; its components are labeled CR1 through CR4. Largest 
Shareholder is the ownership share of the largest shareholder. Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority and Largest Shareholder is Foreign are two dummy 
variables set to 1 if the largest shareholder is a public authority or foreign, respectively. Private Credit is the ratio of claims on private credit to domestic credit, 
and GDPPC is the per capita Gross Domestic Product expressed in USD. Table 1 provides more details on each variable.  
 
  Developed Countries 
(5,477 obs.) 
Developing Countries 
(6,607 obs.) 
Variable  Median  Mean 
Std Error 
of the 
Mean 
Median  Mean 
Std Error 
of the 
Mean 
Tests of 
difference 
in means 
 
p-values 
Loans to Assets  0.544  0.4881  0.0035  0.502  0.484  0.002  0.1520 
Total Assets   1,411,900  16,700,000  1,004,216  320,772  2,997,375  233,426  0.0000 
English  Legal Origin   0  0.154  0.005  0  0.238  0.005  0.0000 
French Legal Origin   0  0.358  0.006  0  0.378  0.006  0.0000 
Socialist Legal Origin   0  0.000  0.000  0  0.237  0.005  0.0000 
German Legal Origin   0  0.419  0.007  0  0.147  0.004  0.0000 
Scandinavian Legal Origin   0  0.069  0.003  0  0.000  0.000  0.0000 
Legal Formalism  170.00  243.710  4.158  380.00  418.910  2.150  0.0000 
CR- Creditors Rights   2  1.899  0.015  2  1.841  0.011  0.0008 
CR1- Restrictions on filing for reorganization  0  0.175  0.005  0  0.415  0.006  0.0000 
CR2- Right to seize collateral  0  0.398  0.007  0  0.305  0.005  0.0000 
CR3- Right to be paid first  1  0.763  0.006  1  0.575  0.006  0.0000 
CR4- Right to run a firm during reorganization  1  0.563  0.007  1  0.545  0.006  0.0195 
Largest Shareholder  0.92  0.675  0.005  0.553  0.580  0.004  0.0000 
Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority  0  0.015  0.002  0  0.078  0.003  0.0000 
Largest Shareholder is Foreign  0  0.332  0.006  0  0.369  0.006  0.0000 
Private Credit to Total Credit  0.850  0.841  0.002  0.790  0.958  0.031  0.0002 
GDPPC  30,340  32,130  168  2,334  3,134  33  0.0000 
  Table 4:  
Random-Effects Regression to Explain the Ratio Total Loans to Total Assets- All Countries 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 2,677 banks in 148 countries over the years 2000-2006, or a total of 12,084 
observations. English, French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian are dummy variables indicating the country’s 
legal origin as first defined by LLSV (1998). English is the omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural 
logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita, as defined 
by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditors’ Rights is an index of four creditors’ rights as first defined by LLSV (1998). 
Ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. Ln 
(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Largest Shareholder is the ownership share of the largest 
shareholder. Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority and Largest Shareholder is Foreign are two dummy 
variables set to 1 if the largest shareholder is a public authority or foreign, respectively. Private Credit is the ratio of 
claims on private credit to domestic credit, and GDPPC is the per capita Gross Domestic Product. Table 1 provides 
more details on each variable. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
French Legal Origin  -0.0494  -0.0728  -0.0645  -0.0587  -0.0603 
   (0.0291)*    (0.0334)**    (0.0361)*    (0.0309)*    (0.0343)*  
Socialist Legal Origin  0.0457  0.0392  0.0235  0.0663  0.0629 
      (0.0280)      (0.0281)      (0.0280)  (0.0232)***    (0.0255)**  
German Legal Origin  -0.0523  -0.0528  -0.0603  -0.0365  -0.038 
      (0.0392)      (0.0395)      (0.0392)      (0.0295)      (0.0325) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin  -0.012  -0.0068  -0.0067  0.0217  0.0216 
      (0.0449)      (0.0405)      (0.0435)      (0.0416)      (0.0431) 
Legal Formalism  0.0102  0.0158  0.0169  0.0202  0.0167 
      (0.0163)      (0.0159)      (0.0154)      (0.0130)      (0.0141) 
CR- Creditors Rights     -0.0232       
     (0.0141)*        
CR1- Restrictions on filing for reorganization      -0.0326  -0.0408  -0.0388 
          (0.0239)   (0.0205)**    (0.0228)*  
CR2- Right to seize collateral      -0.0638  -0.0446  -0.0416 
       (0.0262)**    (0.0252)*       (0.0261) 
CR3- Right to be paid first      -0.0067  -0.0179  -0.0181 
          (0.0276)      (0.0238)      (0.0271) 
CR4- Right to run a firm during reorganization      0.0183  0.0126  0.0114 
          (0.0257)      (0.0202)      (0.0198) 
ln (Total Assets)        0.0223  0.0221 
        (0.0043)***   (0.0045)***  
Largest Shareholder        -0.0425  -0.0436 
         (0.0177)**    (0.0193)**  
Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority        -0.0217  -0.0319 
            (0.0205)      (0.0212) 
Largest Shareholder is Foreign        -0.0132  -0.0178 
            (0.0111)      (0.0110) 
Private Credit to Total Credit          -0.0001 
              (0.0003) 
ln (GDP per capita)  0.0444  0.0451  0.045  0.0273  0.0237 
  (0.0085)***   (0.0085)***   (0.0086)***   (0.0090)***    (0.0095)**  
Constant  0.0748  0.0907  0.0699  -0.0702  -0.014 
      (0.1366)      (0.1346)      (0.1364)      (0.1187)      (0.1233) 
Number of Observations  12,874  12,874  12,874  12,874  12,067 
Number of Banks  2,499  2,499  2,499  2,499  2,351   - 36 - 
Table 5:  
Random-Effects Regression to Explain the Ratio Total Loans to Total Assets- Developed Countries 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,147 banks in 35 countries over the years 2000-2006, or a total of 6,140 
observations. English, French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian are dummy variables indicating the country’s 
legal origin as first defined by LLSV (1998). English is the omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural 
logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita, as defined 
by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditors’ Rights is an index of four creditors’ rights as first defined by LLSV (1998). 
Ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. Ln 
(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Largest Shareholder is the ownership share of the largest 
shareholder. Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority and Largest Shareholder is Foreign are two dummy 
variables set to 1 if the largest shareholder is a public authority or foreign, respectively. Private Credit is the ratio of 
claims on private credit to domestic credit, and GDPPC is the per capita Gross Domestic Product. Table 1 provides 
more details on each variable. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
French Legal Origin  -0.0139  -0.0283  -0.1473  -0.1169  -0.1195 
      (0.0527)      (0.0521)   (0.0720)**    (0.0627)*    (0.0630)*  
Socialist Legal Origin           
           
German Legal Origin  -0.0031  -0.0048  -0.0176  -0.0013  0.0023 
      (0.0593)      (0.0567)      (0.0523)      (0.0463)      (0.0483) 
Scandinavian Legal Origin  0.0633  0.0644  0.0521  0.0794  0.071 
      (0.0596)      (0.0565)      (0.0597)      (0.0580)      (0.0589) 
Legal Formalism  0.0000  0.0037  -0.0027  0.0168  0.0143 
      (0.0149)      (0.0166)      (0.0186)      (0.0144)      (0.0154) 
CR- Creditors Rights     -0.0116       
        (0.0187)       
CR1- Restrictions on filing for reorganization      -0.0368  -0.0498  -0.0495 
          (0.0480)      (0.0390)      (0.0412) 
CR2- Right to seize collateral      -0.0498  -0.0063  -0.0181 
          (0.0323)      (0.0213)      (0.0245) 
CR3- Right to be paid first      -0.1424  -0.1211  -0.1212 
       (0.0613)**    (0.0478)**   (0.0462)***  
CR4- Right to run a firm during reorganization      0.0640  0.0025  0.0094 
       (0.0340)*       (0.0250)      (0.0272) 
Ln (Total Assets)        0.0283  0.0282 
        (0.0073)***   (0.0074)***  
Largest Shareholder        -0.0065  -0.0082 
            (0.0274)      (0.0280) 
Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority        0.0064  0.0007 
            (0.0701)      (0.0716) 
Largest Shareholder is Foreign        -0.0445  -0.0465 
        (0.0159)***   (0.0157)***  
Private Credit to Total Credit          0.0658 
           (0.0304)**  
Ln (GDP per capita)  0.0134  0.013  0.0132  -0.0133  -0.0151 
      (0.0175)      (0.0176)      (0.0176)      (0.0180)      (0.0178) 
Constant  0.3753  0.3886  0.5369  0.3088  0.2892 
   (0.2183)*    (0.2203)*    (0.2299)**       (0.2132)      (0.2108) 
Number of Observations  5,488  5,488  5,488  5,488  5,477 
Number of Banks  1,027  1,027  1,027  1,027  1,026   - 37 - 
Table 6:  
Random-Effects Regression to Explain the Ratio Total Loans to Total Assets- Developing Countries 
Based upon an unbalanced panel of 1,530 banks in 113 countries over the years 2000-2006, or a total of 7,705 
observations. English, French, Socialist, German, and Scandinavian are dummy variables indicating the country’s 
legal origin as first defined by LLSV (1998). English is the omitted category. Legal Formalism is the natural 
logarithm of the number of days needed to recover a debt equal to half of the country’s GDP per capita, as defined 
by Djankov et al. (2007). Creditors’ Rights is an index of four creditors’ rights as first defined by LLSV (1998). 
Ln(GDP per capita) is the natural logarithm of the country’s per capita Gross Domestic Product in each year. Ln 
(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Largest Shareholder is the ownership share of the largest 
shareholder. Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority and Largest Shareholder is Foreign are two dummy 
variables set to 1 if the largest shareholder is a public authority or foreign, respectively. Private Credit is the ratio of 
claims on private credit to domestic credit, and GDPPC is the per capita Gross Domestic Product. Table 1 provides 
more details on each variable. Robust standard errors are clustered by country.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
French Legal Origin  -0.068  -0.098  -0.0875  -0.0738  -0.068 
   (0.0339)**   (0.0360)***   (0.0336)***    (0.0315)**    (0.0337)**  
Socialist Legal Origin  -0.0212  -0.0291  -0.0396  -0.0072  -0.0144 
      (0.0342)      (0.0347)      (0.0320)      (0.0303)      (0.0341) 
German Legal Origin  -0.0638  -0.0645  -0.0863  -0.0691  -0.0433 
      (0.0404)   (0.0380)*    (0.0404)**    (0.0336)**       (0.0295) 
Legal Formalism  -0.0537  -0.0506  -0.0536  -0.0486  -0.0643 
   (0.0272)**    (0.0232)**    (0.0214)**    (0.0203)**   (0.0201)***  
CR- Creditors Rights     -0.0338       
     (0.0149)**        
CR1- Restrictions on filing for reorganization      -0.0466  -0.0522  -0.0407 
       (0.0272)*    (0.0260)**       (0.0270) 
CR2- Right to seize collateral      -0.0933  -0.0808  -0.0783 
      (0.0306)***   (0.0295)***   (0.0294)***  
CR3- Right to be paid first      0.0171  0.0115  0.0155 
          (0.0275)      (0.0257)      (0.0283) 
CR4- Right to run a firm during reorganization      -0.0032  0.0113  0.0151 
          (0.0268)      (0.0252)      (0.0267) 
ln (Total Assets)        0.0139  0.0127 
        (0.0052)***    (0.0055)**  
Largest Shareholder        -0.0481  -0.0461 
        (0.0162)***   (0.0176)***  
Largest Shareholder is State/ Public Authority        -0.0298  -0.043 
            (0.0190)   (0.0185)**  
Largest Shareholder is Foreign        0.0045  0.0024 
            (0.0133)      (0.0143) 
Private Credit to Total Credit          -0.0001 
              (0.0003) 
ln (GDP per capita)  0.0608  0.0622  0.0652  0.0524  0.0488 
   (0.0090)***   (0.0088)***   (0.0082)***   (0.0086)***   (0.0096)***  
Constant  0.3805  0.4279  0.4033  0.2992  0.4247 
   (0.1791)**   (0.1585)***   (0.1457)***    (0.1504)**   (0.1481)***  
Number of Observations  7,386  7,386  7,386  7,386  6,590 
Number of Banks  1,472  1,472  1,472  1,472  1,325 
 